# The Three Dynamics of Human Progress: A Unified Theory Applicable to Individuals, Institutions, and Society

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The Three Dynamics Theory presents a value system for understanding human progress.[1] The system can be applied to assessing the progress or development of individual persons or small groups, larger organizations, and society. It attempts to unify various fields of human study—including psychology, economics, politics, and religion—through a single set of values for examining progress in every arena of human activity. This paper will present the overall theory and apply it to psychology and psychiatry.

The tendency to divide human understanding into diverse disciplines or academic departments is largely self-defeating and by itself is enough to encourage failure in understanding life and in achieving personal fulfillment. A goal of this paper is to help to rejuvenate a holistic view of human affairs—one which recognizes the essential unit of human nature and all human activities.

The table "The Three Dynamics of Human Progress" summarizes the theory, which will be used to contrast the principles of humanistic, existential psychology with those of contemporary biopsychiatry.

## DYNAMIC I: LOVE

Love is joyful awareness or treasuring of the essential worth of any aspect of life or life itself. Love is our own felt experience of ourselves, others, or other aspects of life. Love may color a relationship, but it's not the same as a relationship.

Love may be viewed as a basic human need (Breggin, 1992). The mode in which love is expressed through human relationships is designated the love dynamic.

Love exists along the maturational continuum from infancy to adulthood. Adult love reaches toward essences, basic values, cores, inner realities, the divine, the life force. Whether we are in love with someone or

## The Three Dynamics of Human Progress for Individuals, Institutions, and Societies

| INDIVIDUAL SPIRITUAL STATE | MODE OF INTERACTION |
|---|---|

### DYNAMIC I: LOVE—THE HIGHEST INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL CONDITION

| *Beingness* | *Loving Affiliation or Gifting* |
|---|---|
| The Human as a Being or Soul | Irrelevance or Abhorrence of Force |
| Self as Source of Love | Mutual Unconditional Love |
| Reverence for Self | Treasuring of all People |
| Acceptance of Self & Life | Peace & Harmony with Life |
| Spiritual Self-fulfillment | Kindness, Empathy & Generosity |
| Worth of all Selves | Concern for Human Destiny |
| Communality of all Selves | Humanity as One Family |
| Integrity, Wholeness of Self | Oneness with Nature, God, Life |
| Devotion to Higher Values | Promotion of Liberty & Love |
| Love of Truth & Knowledge | Enlightenment |

### DYNAMIC II: LIBERTY—THE OPTIMAL CONDITION FOR PROGRESS

| *Doingness* | *Voluntary Exchange* |
|---|---|
| The Human as Agent or Doer | Force Limited to Self-defense |
| Self as Creator of Effects | Control over Physical Universe |
| Uniqueness of Self | Pursuit of Personal Destiny |
| Responsibility; Honesty | Contracts & Agreements |
| Egoism & Self-interest | Competition; Limited Cooperation |
| Respect for Self | Personal and Business Ethics |
| Self-direction; Autonomy | Bargaining and Free Enterprise |
| Reliance on Reason | Scientific & Technical Progress |
| Individualism | Respect for Rights & Freedoms |
| Personal Success | Personal & Socioeconomic Progress |
| Antiauthoritarianism | Open, Pluralistic Society |

### DYNAMIC III: COERCION—THE LOWEST HUMAN CONDITION

| *Thingness* | *Involuntary Relationships* |
|---|---|
| The Human as Object or Thing | Arbitrary or Unlimited Force |
| Self as a Reaction or Effect | Prediction & Social Control |
| Self-hate & Self-oppression | Hatred & Violence to Attain Ends |
| Selfishness & Egomania | Envy & Distrust; No Cooperation |
| Dishonesty Toward Self | Lying, Cheating & Fraud |
| Out of Touch with Self | Alienation, Remoteness |
| Anti-individualistic | Adjustment & Survival Values |
| Biological View of Self | Physical Theories & Therapies |
| Behavioral View of Self | Behavioral Theories & Therapies |
| Mechanistic View of Self | Scientism |
| Personal Failure; Psychosis | Socioeconomic Decline |
| Authoritarianism | Closed, Totalitarian Society |

loving an aspect of nature, love has an aura of reverence about it. This is why Albert Schweitzer (1951) spoke of "reverence for life" as the ultimate philosophical viewpoint. The word "treasuring" catches much of the meaning. In the most complete expression of a loving viewpoint, all of life and all individual lives are treasured.

It is well known that the ancient Greeks had a word for each of the several kinds of love, from *eros* (sexual love) to *agape* (love for God or humankind). There is a common thread in all expressions of love—the happy, reverent awareness or treasuring of the essential worth of some aspect of life.

### THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN AND HUMANIST TRADITIONS OF LOVE

In the Judeo-Christian tradition, all beings are to be treasured, and the highest attainment is to participate in a spiritual universe of love for the Creator and for all the Creator's creatures and creations. All people become the Chosen People. This is also what Buber (1968) meant when he spoke of the "central significance" of his own work—"namely, the close connexion of the relation to God with the relation to one's fellowman" (pp. 123–124).

This theme of joyful love of people and of life is repeated by humanistic philosophers from Spinoza through Buber and Gandhi. It is what Corliss Lamont (1982) means in *The Philosophy of Humanism* when he says, "Humanism urges men to accept freely and joyously the great boon of life and to realize that life in its own right and for its own sake can be as beautiful and splendid as any dream of immortality" (p. 227). There is a remarkable correspondence between the best of the Judeo-Christian and humanist traditions.

Directed at our fellow human beings, love says "I take joy in you—your very essence, your soul, you identity." This positive acknowledgment of the essential qualities of the individual distinguishes love from esteem, which focuses on achievements or accomplishments (see below). When we love, we feel a direct connectedness with the loved person. This is Buber's "I and thou" relationship, which he finds common to all good human encounters, including psychotherapy.

This means that love, unlike esteem, is infinitely expandable. If we could see or know the essence of anyone—or of any aspect of life—we would take joy in it. We would rejoice at our connectedness, our knowingness, our awareness of that which we are experiencing in life—all of life. This again is the best message of both the Judeo-Christian and humanist traditions.

I have emphasized love as reaching to all life. This assumes that life is essentially good. To the extent we believe in evil, then love becomes more

finite. It might even be replaced by revulsion. My own views on this are anything but firm. My tendency is to believe that people are born with a potential to express good or evil, in particular, to be loving or hateful. Love between people, then, reaches toward our inherent potential to be good and loving.

Even if we are uncomfortable with concepts of good and evil, it is clear that the products of human activity are often harmful in the extreme. We will feel some form of revulsion toward these activities and their outcomes. Our knowledge of what it is to be loving will make us painfully aware of the negative alternative.

## LOVE AS A UNIFYING EXPERIENCE

Because love reaches toward essences or cores, it gives a sense of the unity of all life. In humanistic psychology, we find this in Maslow's (1969) descriptions of Being Cognition in peak religious and love experiences:

> In some reports, particularly of the mystic experience or the religious experience or philosophical experience, the whole of the world is seen as a unity, as a single rich life entity. In other of the peak experiences, most particularly the love experience, one small part of the world is perceived as if it were for the moment all the world. In both cases the perception is of unity. (P. 83)

The seemingly paradoxical connection between the individualistic and the universal in love is suggested by philosopher David Norton (1976) when he explains how love unfolds "the universality of preciousness in persons as unique individuals." The treasuring of human life can be experienced as both a universal truth and a response to particular individuals.

In the *Art of Loving* (1956), Fromm is explicit in telling us that, "In essence, all human beings are identical. We are all part of One; we are One." Love for one person ultimately inspires us to love all persons. Fromm parallels the theological and psychological implications of love. Theology leads us to love God as psychology leads us to love people: "As the logical consequence of theology is mysticism, so the ultimate consequence of psychology is love."

In Dynamic I: Love, we become aware that the beauty discoverable in ourselves is discoverable as well in others, in humanity as a whole, in nature, in God, in love itself as an ideal. In *The Religions of Man* (1965), Huston Smith describes the kind of person required by modern civilizations:

> His roots in his family, his community, his civilization will be deep, but in that very depth he will strike the water table of man's common humanity and thus nourished will reach out in more active curiosity,

> more open vision, to discover and understand what others have seen. For is he not also man? (P. 8)

When we love, we realize that all of life is cut from one and the same spiritual cloth. When we love another person, we see in the other the same spiritual essence that we experience in ourselves. We feel in many ways the same and even identical to the other whom we love. Barriers between self and other—and even between self and life itself—melt!

### EXPRESSIONS OF LOVE

People express love not only toward other people but toward almost everything and anything in life, including houseplants, pets, and inanimate objects. Others may love art, literature, music, or an infinite number of hobbies from carpentry to bird watching. Work and play of all kinds can inspire in us a "joyful, reverent awareness" of life.

Often these activities are not only loving in themselves but also draw people together in affiliation. On the most intellectual level, we discover the joy Einstein felt in understanding "God's universe" and in sharing this adventure with other scientists. In the following quotation (cited in Clark, 1984), a friend records Einstein's meeting with fellow physicist Lorentz. Note the joy in each other and in their shared scientific work:

> Lorentz sat smiling at an Einstein completely lost in meditation, exactly the way a father looks at a particularly beloved son—full of secure confidence that the youngster will crack the nut he has given him, but eager to see how. It took quite a while, but suddenly Einstein's head shot up joyfully; he "had" it. Still a bit of give and take, interrupting one another, a partial disagreement, very quick clarification and a complete mutual understanding, and then both men with beaming eyes skimming over the shining riches of the new theory. (P. 240)

We tend to overlook or even ridicule the far more commonplace expressions of men and women toward their athletic teams and heroes, and the friends with whom they share these experiences. As in both science and athletics, these experiences can also become viciously competitive, smacking more of Dynamic III: Oppression than Dynamic I: Love. But this unholy human penchant for corrupting the beautiful can be found in any endeavor.

### LOVING INSTITUTIONS

Some institutions express a joyful identification with life. We find this in religions which preach tolerance and God's love for the family of humankind. We find it in some fraternal groups whose aims are affiliation and

charity. Many self-help groups inspire their members to progress from oppression toward liberty and love.

We may also find Dynamic I: Love embodied in some free-market corporations and in the values of those who promote these institutions (Scott and Hart, 1979). Hart has eloquently endorsed the expression of self-love and love for others—Adam Smith's "benevolence"—in business organizations (1986):

> Most of all, however, benevolence must be embodied in modern organizations. All management theory and practice must be derived from the dual aspects of human nature: the love of self and the love of others. For that reason, even a management theory based upon self-love . . . is insufficient, because it ignores the essential other half of human motivations: the non-instrumental need to love others. (P. 31)

Affirmation of loving relationships can also be seen in family-owned farms and businesses, worker-owned cooperatives, and small business partnerships. Expressions of workplace democracy, such as employee stock ownership and profit-sharing plans, offer some encouragement toward relations grounded in affinity.

At their best, various institutions which support science, philosophy, psychology, or art may express a loving search for truth and beauty, as well as a sense of international fellowship. The same may be said for many institutions which promote diverse enterprises from athletics and culture through charity, environmentalism, and political freedom.

## ROMANTIC LOVE

Romantic love is a joyful, reverent awareness of one particular person with a passionate desire for physical as well as spiritual knowledge or union. Romantic love is a highly individualistic, passionate expression of the ideal that love is joy and that people are treasures. While it flourishes when and where individuals and their freedom are most valued (Breggin, 1980 and 1987), it is not an exclusive product of modern individualism. Romantic love is alive and well in ancient poetry from many parts of the world, including Persia, Japan, China, and Greece. It is found in the Bible in the Song of Solomon, the story of David and Bathsheba, the misadventures of Samson with gentile women, and in a very pure form in the life of Jacob and Rachel. Later still it is exemplified in the Roman myth of Cupid and Psyche, before appearing in a very similar model in many renaissance stories, culminating in Romeo and Juliet.

Frequently, romantic love includes a spiritual conception of love as linking the human and the divine. Psyche, whose name means soul, becomes an immortal god through her love for Cupid. That romantic love is

soul means that it cannot be earned. In Viktor Frankl's (1955) words, love is a kind of "grace" or "salvation" bestowed by one human being upon another. This unconditional love reaches toward the "spiritual core of the other person, the reality of the other's essential nature and his potential worth." In keeping with the spiritual nature of love, Frankl believes, as I do, that the sexual aspect is not primary. It is not "an end in itself, but a means of expression." Similarly, "as the body is for the lover the expression of the partner's spiritual being, the sexual act is for the lover the expression of a spiritual intention."

Norton (1976) in *Personal Destinies* finds that love does not make us blind as much as it makes us spiritually insightful. Maslow (1969) and others have suggested that love, in perceiving the inherent worth of another, constitutes a revelation.

### LOVE COMPARED TO ESTEEM

Since love reaches toward essences, inner realities, inherent human qualities—it is unconditional or noncontingent in nature. It may be easier to love persons who are more visible or accessible to us; but we love them soul to soul and hence without reservation.

By contrast, esteem for others—a barometer of how we feel toward their accomplishments or ethics—provides us at best with an unstable and insubstantial basis for relating. Esteem is more characteristic, as we shall see, of intermediate Dynamic II: Liberty. Esteem cannot connect us to pets, infants, or children, whose lives have little to commend them in terms of accomplishments. It cannot connect us to things which are beyond esteem, such as God or nature. Esteem cannot sustain feelings of affinity for someone whom we perceive as acting unethically.

To the therapist, the distinction between esteem and love can be soul-saving. It is often hard to respect how our clients conduct their lives; but it is always possible to connect lovingly to anyone in whom we are willing to recognize our common humanity. Our respect or esteem for our clients is limited by how they live their lives, but our love for them is limited only by how we live ours. This loving connection to our clients—even if barely expressed—brings richness and joy to us under otherwise intolerable conditions and offers a much-needed human lifeline to the client.

### SELF-LOVE COMPARED TO SELF-ESTEEM

Self-love, exactly like love for others, reaches toward and joyfully affirms our own inner core, identity, or soul. To love ourselves is to be happy that we exist. The key again is "joyful awareness." Self-love is not an affirmation of our personality, character, or anything else that is under

our direct control. Self-love is not selfish in the typical meaning of that word. Since self-love says "I am of worth as an expression of humanity, life, or God," it immediately implies that all people have that same basic worth and can be loved. Love for self inspires the assessment that no matter how bad or unsuccessful we have been, we still deserve to live and to thrive. Again, the difference from esteem is critical.

People who place total reliance on self-esteem for their sense or worth can collapse upon failing or upon discovering their human flaws. In psychotherapy, for example, our task often involves encouraging a basic love for self that cuts through the sense of failure and discouragement. It is often helpful for the client to understand that he or she—as any human being—has an inherent value even in the face of failure and unethical conduct.

## TRANSCENDING EGOISM AND ALTRUISM

Love is the most ethically pure and perfect spiritual state because love brings happiness into the individual's own life while fully enhancing the lives of others. Love is selfish in the joy it brings us and altruistic in its identification of the other with our own happiness. To nurture or even sacrifice for a loved one is to nurture and sacrifice for ourselves. Love transcends distinctions between selfishness and altruism, and even between self and other, by serving the happiness of all involved.

As Norton (1976) describes, love desires "the prosperity and fulfillment of the beloved as the unique and precious enterprise that passion reveals her to be." Our loved one's interests begin to approximate and at times to equal our own in importance. We become so identified with the other that our independent interests become mutual. Even the lost of our own life for the sake of a loved one may not strike us as a sacrifice but as a furthering of our own values, even our own selves. Our sense of self is no longer focused strictly on ourselves as individuals but on ourselves as participants in something more encompassing: our relationship with loved ones, family, group, culture, or humanity. Competition is transcended by mutuality and a sense of shared identity.

## LOVE, GIFTING, AND CONFLICT

While it is not itself a relationship, love encourages and motivates certain ways of relating, including sharing and the giving of gifts ("gifting"). Acts of mercy and generosity grow out of love. Deep-seated conflicts are resolved through the loving concern we have for those with whom we find ourselves in conflict (Breggin, 1992). Indeed, love is the antidote to harmful conflict as the loved one's needs approximate or even surpass our own in importance.

### LOVE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Where do human rights come from? Nature, God, reason? Or are they figments of our imagination? There are many ways to answer these questions about the origin of human rights, but too often overlooked is the role of love. Love for others is not the only motive for granting all persons the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but it may be the most sound and enduring. Love affirms that each person is an expression of something good and wonderful, and from this it flows that each person has an equal right to survive and grow.

The Declaration of Independence speaks of all persons being "created equal" with the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Human rights were connected to what was perceived as the God-given spiritual worth of each person. This spiritual-political link was very much in the consciousness of the Founding Fathers and those who influenced them.

To dismiss the rights of others—to compromise their liberty—we must specifically separate our victims from the mainstream of human life and declare them to be of inherently less value than ourselves and our associates. This fate has befallen oppressed political groups, cultural minorities, slaves, women, and children. To love is to reject such devaluations.

Because it is so hard for most people to take joy in the existence of others—beyond their immediate friends, families, or close groups—there is relatively little motivation to respect human rights in general. There is even less motivation to care about human well-being in general. Support for human rights and human well-being—at best a flimsy structure in our various cultures—ends up relying too heavily on fear of authority.

## DYNAMIC II: LIBERTY

As love is characterized by the individual as a being or soul, liberty is characterized by the individual as an agent or doer. Accomplishment, control, and impact on the world are valued. Self-determination, the ethical pursuit of self-interest, and self-esteem are central ethics.

Like love, liberty may be viewed as a basic need. It encompasses the need for freedom, autonomy, self-determination, and self-esteem. The liberty dynamic identifies the expression of this group of needs through particular kinds of libertarian relationships (Breggin, 1992).

The two dynamics, love and liberty, differ in their view of force. In Dynamic I: Love, force is irrelevant because interests have become mutual. Indeed, in loving relationships the very idea of using force, even in self-defense, is abhorrent. Liberty, by contrast, may be defined as the

dynamic in which force is used only in self-defense and only in the minimally necessary degree (see Rothbard, 1973, and Adam Smith, 1759/1976, 1776/1982, for similar definitions). To accept liberty is to reject force except in self-defense. In effect we agree never to initiate force or never to use it to gain our own ends.

The prohibition against force usually includes fraud (lying, cheating, misrepresenting). In our personal lives, but not in the political arena, the prohibition against force can be expanded to include emotional bullying of all kinds. You and I can decide we won't ever allow ourselves to be emotionally bullied; in the extreme, we are free to reject people who do this to us (Breggin, 1980). But if we try to legislate this ban on emotional manipulation, as in Fromm's utopia in which materialistic advertising would be forbidden (1976), we may perpetuate a Big Brother state typical of Dynamic III: Oppression.

Liberty as a cultural ideal is relatively new. It is often dated to the 18th century but has earlier roots in the 14th century (Oakeshott, 1979). The concept of liberty has been most fully explored in the political and economic arena; but as I tried to show in *The Psychology of Freedom* (1980), the same principles can be applied in the personal arena. Indeed, these libertarian concepts are easier to apply in our personal lives, where, unlike in the political and economic arena, we can *personally* decide not to abuse liberty by creating monopolies or other associations that suppress or take advantage of weaker individuals or groups.

Liberty is more limited than love in granting rights to others without necessarily feeling any investment in their well-being, happiness, or existence. We acknowledge their right to pursue happiness without necessarily taking any interest in the outcome.

Liberty is a dynamic state of potential—an open field of opportunity. It is up to each individual to cultivate the ground and to bring forth his or her unique contributions to life, for better or worse. But liberty unsweetened by love can become an excuse for callousness and indifference to others. It can justify running roughshod over disadvantaged individuals and groups. Liberty without love can become menace.

On the other hand, attempts to promote love while bypassing liberty can also result in oppression. If I try to force someone to love me, I not only aim at the impossible, I become an oppressor. Similarly, if I try to force other people to be loving, I end up fostering not Dynamic I: Love but what will be described as Dynamic III: Coercion or Oppression. All this is obvious in our personal lives but less so in our political affairs, where we often with to take shortcuts to a better world by forcing people to behave the way we want them to, even though they are not violating the rights of

others. There are no easy solutions to this inherent problem, but a greater awareness is a good beginning.

As Szasz (1965, 1974) and I have pointed out, attempts to be "loving" to so-called mental patients by treating them against their will results in outright oppression. The involuntary psychiatric system with its toxic drugs, electroshock, and coercive mental hospitals is a paradigm for attempting to force "help" or "caring" upon people (see Breggin, 1991).

## LIBERTY AND INDIVIDUALISM

Liberty is closely connected to the concept of individualism. Henry Grady Weaver (1953) sought the mainspring of individualism and liberty: "1. Only an individual human being can generate human energy" and "2. Only an individual human being can control the energy he creates" (p. 31).

In his classic, *The Road to Serfdom*, economist, psychologist, and philosopher Friedrich Hayek (1974) found liberty and individualism at the root of human progress. He defined the fundamental principle of freedom as follows:

> the respect for the individual man qua man, that is, the recognition of his views and tastes as supreme in his own sphere, however narrowly that may be circumscribed, and the belief that it is desirable that men should develop their own individual gifts and bents. (P. 14)

Liberty and individualism are the twin hearts of the free enterprise system and the open society. They are also fundamental to much that we call humanistic psychology, but they are not its ultimate expression. Humanistic, existential psychology expresses a loving viewpoint based on liberty. Only individuals and a society committed to a loving attitude toward all people can ameliorate the hazards of liberty described by Marx (1964), Galbraith (1958), and many others.

## LIBERTY AND VOLUNTARY EXCHANGE

Because liberty restrains us from using force to achieve our personal or political ends, it encourages us to try alternative approaches, such as bargaining or making exchanges. But liberty cannot force us to do anything positive. It can only prohibit us from using force or fraud to attain our ends. In ruling out force, liberty encourages us to be more creative. Ideally it inspires us to make offers that others will not wish to refuse. Restrained by the mutual freedom of all, we must "give in in order to get" in our various exchanges or agreements. This is practical altruism in contrast to love. While these principles were first elaborated in the economic and

political arena, it is often easier to see them at work in our personal lives, where every attempt to use force to gain our ends with our loved ones immediately brings a variety of bad consequences for all concerned. And in our personal lives, the excesses of liberty can be largely ameliorated through love. In the political or economic arena, where love seldom binds the participants, liberty is far more hazardous.

## ADAM SMITH'S INVISIBLE HAND

Economist and moral philosopher Adam Smith was among the first to demonstrate how liberty serves the common good. In 1776 in *The Wealth of Nations*, he described how the partners to a voluntary exchange must believe they will benefit from it—that somehow they will be better off after the exchange—or else they would not enter into it. Because it allows for personal choice, liberty or voluntary exchange maximizes each person's opportunity to make the most out of life from his or her own subjective viewpoint. Smith went so far as to assert that the common good is better served by the individual who seeks his own best interest than by those who seek to impose a common good through government action. He coined a famous phrase, "the invisible hand," to express the principle that the pursuit of self-interest leads to the general welfare even though none of the participants intend it (Smith, 1976).

From Smith's seminal observations arose the concept of spontaneous order—the creative, productive patterns of cooperative relationship that arise naturally when human beings pursue their own self-interest in the context of liberty (see Rothbard, 1973, 1979; von Mises, 1966, 1972; Hayek, 1974). No manager or planner could ever impose these patterns on a society; only free individuals can generate them.

Recent events in Russia and Eastern Europe have confirmed some of the essentials of classical liberal economic theory. But the problem remains that without a truly loving attitude toward each other, liberty results in its own distorted outcomes with even greater accumulations of wealth at the expense of the poor.

When liberty and love are both active as principles, humanistic psychology can provide a framework for understanding human progress. The free-market economist knows that no central planner or manager can create a productive society, but only establish its conditions through liberty; the humanistic psychologist knows that no authoritarian therapist can make a client live better, but only establish a creative relationship in which it may possibly be learned. What the humanistic view adds to liberty is the importance of a loving attitude, in this case toward the client and his or her aspirations. If the therapist takes a purely competitive libertarian stance

toward the client, he or she might instead take advantage, for example, by encouraging dependency in order to maintain the fee-paying relationship.

## FREE-ENTERPRISE AND HUMANISTIC, EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A SHARED CONCEPT OF HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Two hundred years after Adam Smith, another economist, Ludwig von Mises (1966), in *Human Action*, elaborated upon why economic progress requires liberty. Progress, he found, grows from the combined efforts of private individuals attempting to fulfill their own subjective needs. Only the subjective individual can effectively assess his or her own wishes and goals, and he or she can do this only when free to think and to choose. Thus Mises connected progress in economics to individualism, liberty, and each person's right to pursue his or her own subjective values.

Mises built his economics on a principle implicit in much of humanistic psychology:

> The ultimate goal of human action is always the satisfaction of the acting man's desire. There is no standard of greater or lesser satisfaction other than individual judgments of value, different for various people and for the same person at various times.

He linked this individualism directly to freedom when he said, "Nobody is in a position to decree what should make a fellow man happy" (p. 14).

Murray Rothbard (1979), an admirer of Mises, again provides a conception of human nature that provides a common basis with humanistic psychology:

> The glory of the human race is the uniqueness of each individual, the fact that every person, though similar in many ways to others, possesses a completely individuated personality of his own. It is the fact of each person's uniqueness—the fact that no two people can be wholly interchangeable—that makes each and every man irreplaceable and makes us care whether he lives or dies, whether he is happy or oppressed. And, finally, it is the fact that these unique personalities need freedom for their full development that constitutes one of the major arguments for a free society. (P. 85)

Again, without intending it, political scientist Oakeshott (1979) places the development of individualism, liberty, and capitalism in its historical context in a manner wholly consistent with humanistic psychology:

> There have been occasions, some of them in the distant past, when, usually as a consequence of the collapse of a closely integrated manner of living, human individuality has emerged and has been enjoyed for a time. . . . The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in western Europe

> were an occasion of this kind. What began to emerge then were conditions so preeminently favorable to a very high degree of human individuality, and human beings enjoying (to such a degree and in such numbers) the experience of "self-determination" in conduct and belief, that it overshadows all earlier occasions of the sort. (P. 316)

Still, according to Oakeshott, by the 16th century these values had been firmly established. He is talking about the roots of economic and political liberty, but he could just as well be talking about the roots of humanistic psychology when he writes:

> The disposition to regard a high degree of individuality in conduct and in belief as the condition proper to mankind and as the main ingredient in human "happiness," had become one of the significant dispositions of modern European character. (P. 319)

## LIBERTY, HUMAN POTENTIAL, AND PSYCHOLOGY

By rooting economic progress in human liberty and in the right of the individual to make his or her own subjective choices, economists in the classical liberal tradition of Adam Smith, Hayek, Mises, and Rothbard have provided a common basis of humanistic psychology, economics, and politics. The subjective, choice-making person of these free-market economists is the same person we address and promote in humanistic psychology.

Consider, for example, the conclusion of Carl Rogers's (1961) critique of Skinnerian philosophy. Rogers describes psychology as a viewpoint based upon values derived from the "subjective choice" of "free persons":

> In conclusion, then, it is my contention that science cannot come into being without a personal choice of values we wish to achieve. And these values we choose to implement will forever lie outside of the science which implements them; the goals we select, the purposes we wish to follow, must always be outside of the science which achieves them. To me this has the encouraging meaning that the human person, with his capacity for subjective choice, can and will always exist, separate from and prior to any of his scientific undertakings. Unless as individuals and groups we choose to relinquish our capacity for subjective choice, we will always remain free persons. . . . (Pp. 400–401)

A recent contribution, Alan Waterman's *The Psychology of Individualism* (1984), reviews the research literature on individualism. His findings contradict the prevailing academic antipathy toward individualism: Individualists consistently measure higher than others in their fellow feeling or concern for others. The results are especially impressive because the studies surveyed were rarely if ever performed by psychologists with a bias toward individualism.

This brings us to a basic issue for most humanistic psychologists who tend to identify individualism and economic liberty with a callous attitude toward others. Even though free-market and humanist psychology theories share a common ground in promoting the freedom of the subjective, choice-making individual, humanistic psychology and the human potential movement have too often identified economic liberty as their enemy. This is because liberty in the political arena, untempered by love, too often does lead to callousness and disregard for the needs of others; but it need not do so in the arena of personal psychology, where we can make sure that our principles encompass both liberty and love.

Fromm (1976), for example, rejects the distortions of Marx found in modern socialist nations, but nonetheless links the good society with Marx's moral philosophy. Fromm goes so far as to call for a government educational campaign as the first step toward influencing the public to accept Fromm's own personal conception of the good life, which he bases on "being" rather than "having." While I applaud many aspects of his basic value system, which parallels my own distinctions between Dynamic I: Love, and Dynamic II: Liberty, I am uncomfortable with Fromm's willingness to impose his own values through state manipulation and force. He ends up promoting a socialist mix of Dynamic I: Love, and Dynamic III: Oppression, with among other things an FDA-like central government cultural committee to educate the public on what's good for it.

Following Fromm's tradition, humanistic, existential psychologists too often promote socialism as the only hope for a more loving society. They still look forward to greater government enforcement of the ethics of altruism, as well as various other more personal values. Meanwhile, free enterprise is equated with alienation and exploitation. While usually supporting freedom in the personal and private spheres of morals, they denounce economic freedom and mistakenly equate it with the welfare-warfare state that increasingly dominates our lives.

Humanistic, existential psychologists who favor personal freedom for themselves and their clients in their more private lives have been unable to generate a coherent approach to economic and political liberty. We too often end up denigrating economic liberty, in defiance of the truth that humanistic psychology has grown and thrived only in the relatively free and individualistic atmosphere that is characteristic of Western politics. What psychology needs to promote is the combination of liberty and love.

## VOLUNTARY EXCHANGE (LIBERTY) IN OUR PERSONAL LIVES

The use of force only in self-defense, and only in the minimally necessary amount, is the first axiom of political and personal relationships. In our personal lives, we may extend the definition of force to include emotional

bullying of all kinds. As free persons, we can reject attempts to get around our wishes by manipulating our emotions. We can insist that people make "clean" offers to us without trying to influence us through our vulnerabilities. I call this the unconditional right to self-defense (1980).

Here is an example of how exchange works in our personal lives. Let us suppose Jim loves Jane. We would describe this as Dynamic I: Love; it is Jim's personal, self-generated feeling of joy about Jane. When Jim then decides that he wants to convince Jane to live with him, he enters another arena entirely, that of Dynamic II: Liberty, specifically, voluntary exchange. The rules are different here. Jim's love for Jane does not automatically earn him the right to have her live with him. Nor can he fulfill his desires by bullying or threatening Jane, for example, by making her feel guilty: "I'll kill myself if you don't live with me." At the same time, Jane's unconditional right to self-defense mandates that she can remove herself from any influence he tries to exert, simply because she wishes to.

As a result, Jim must make Jane an offer attractive enough to win her over and he must do so in terms acceptable to her or not at all. He could tell her, "I love you, and that brings me so much joy that all I want is to be around you. I believe my love will also bring happiness to you." He might also offer her a home, or money, or a mutual relationship with shared responsibilities.

Free of fear and intimidation in regard to each other, Jim and Jane will conclude an agreement to live together if and when each finds it beneficial. The invisible hand operates equally in the economic and the private arenas.

On the other hand, if Jim bullies Jane into living with him, perhaps by playing on her guilt, then the invisible hand withdraws. If Jane gives in to this emotional manipulation, the outcome of this exchange may be highly detrimental to her.

Many unresolved relationship conflicts can be best understood as problems of exchange. The goal is to encourage voluntary exchanges and to discourage involuntary ones. It is always helpful to separate these from more spiritual questions, such as "Am I in love?" or "Do I value this person?"

## SELF-DETERMINATION VERSUS SPIRITUAL FULFILLMENT

Self-direction or self-determination is a central psychological and ethical theme of Dynamic II: Liberty. Psychologies which largely or wholly promote this dynamic of human progress emphasize autonomy, personal responsibility, and self-esteem (e.g., Szasz, 1965; Branden, 1969). From this viewpoint, the human being as agent or doer and the philosophy of individualism are the highest levels of conceptualization. Some of my earlier work (1971) represents this attitude. Self-determination does not fully account for love and connectedness to higher values or God. Concepts such as self-actualization (Maslow, 1969) and individuation (Jung, 1944)

encompass a more spiritual orientation than self-direction and self-determination. To avoid promoting any particular school of psychology, I have chosen the phrase psychospirituality to designate viewpoints which include but transcend self-direction and self-determination.

As we seek psychospiritual fulfillment, we do not reject self-determination. We understand it as a fundamental dynamic in personal and political growth. We retain the overall concept of liberty but we also transcend the notion of autonomy or personal responsibility and recognize the paradox that much of our progress is based on what others have given us, including love and moral support. Indeed, the paradox is built into us at an early stage of development. As Haworth (1986) has described, a child cannot develop autonomy, and many adults cannot maintain autonomy, without a supportive social network.

In psychotherapy or in life, self-determination as an issue must usually be addressed before that of psychospiritual fulfillment. In a failing marriage, for example, the first step in restoring any hope for a decent relationship is the enforcement of liberty. Each member must stop abusing the other; they must resort to force only in self-defense and only to the minimally necessary degree. Often one member or both will fail to defend against debilitating emotional attacks. These same individuals may react at other times with extreme overkill, trying to get even for real and imagined hurts going back years in time. Dynamic II: Liberty—freedom and self-determination—must be established before each may begin to feel safe enough to explore the possibilities of Dynamic I: Love (Breggin, 1980).

Again paralleling economic and political principles of liberty, notice that freedom can be enforced in our private lives. The therapist treating a couple can insist that neither partner use emotional bullying, threats, or outright force, especially in therapy sessions where the therapist sets the ground rules. Dynamic II: Liberty can be enforced because it involves the suppression of specific destructive actions. When the dynamic is enforced, well-intentioned individuals will reap the benefits of voluntary exchange. They will begin to discuss issues, to bargain about differences of opinion, and to make offers to get what they want from each other. Fortunately, the mini-utopia of the therapeutic setting is far easier to establish than the more complex and baffling political utopia of liberty.

Unlike liberty, love cannot be coerced. If people grow to love each other, it must flow from themselves as spontaneous expressions of their innermost selves. The growth of this love may be encouraged by greater liberty, but it cannot be guaranteed. It can be nurtured by a loving therapist and by loving family members, but it can in no way be forced or compelled.

Most people feel so vulnerable about loving that the moment they feel coerced, they withdraw their love. When we are afraid of each other—

when physical or emotional bullying dominates our lives—we distrust and fear each other. If you are likely to use force against me to attain your own ends, I must be wary of you. I especially don't want you to see my tender, vulnerable side. If anything, I will want to hide from you or to intimidate you in order to protect myself from your arbitrary force. This makes it harder for you to see and to love me in the personal or political arena.

Similarly, if I wish to oppress you, I will want to deny your human qualities—those aspects of humanity we have in common. It is too painful to injure someone with whom we identify. So an atmosphere of oppression discourages oppressors from seeing their victims, while also discouraging the victims of oppression from making themselves known. Thus, oppression on any level of life discourages joyful, reverent awareness of each other.

## DYNAMIC III: COERCION

In Dynamic I (love), the individual is viewed as a being and in Dynamic II (liberty) as an agent or doer. In Dynamic III (coercion) the individual is degraded to an object or thing. The focus is on the mechanistic or bio-behavioral aspects of the individual—his or her thingness. Autonomy, self-determination, and related attributes are rejected or ignored. Beingness is ridiculed as mysticism or poetry.

In *Beyond Conflict* (1992), I discuss whether or not coercion should be considered a basic need or a learned response to frustration and injury. It is a difficult question. Here I am conceptualizing coercion to be a built-in (but largely destructive) need which becomes fulfilled through oppressive relationships. Again, the basic need and its unique social expression is called a dynamic.

As love is the state of highest spiritual growth, and as liberty is the intermediate stage of progress, oppression is the arena of personal, social, and economic failure. As love is characterized by the irrelevance or abhorrence of force, and liberty by the ethical use of force, oppression is characterized by the arbitrary use of force. Force becomes a means to an end beyond the protection of liberty. Whether in a therapy, a marriage, or a nation, oppression involves the use of force to obtain our aims.

Regardless of the good intentions of the individual using force, certain negative outcomes flow from it.

### COERCION IN OUR PERSONAL LIVES

Oppressed individuals may use force against themselves. "If you don't stop drinking, I'll hate you," oppressed persons threaten themselves. Suicide and self-mutilation are extreme expressions of self-oppression. The

self-oppressed individual also submits to force at the hands of others. The victim learns to respond to guilt, shame, and anxiety as means of control within the original family, and then submits again to these oppressive forces in adulthood. As Fromm (1941), Reich (1946), and others (e.g., Breggin, 1975) have shown, oppression in the family sows the seeds for oppression in the wider society, and vice versa, in a vicious circle of personal and political oppression. Fromm has described with special insight how the oppressed individual often uses arbitrary force and authority against others, while in turn submitting to more powerful authorities.

In *The Psychology of Freedom* (1980), I have tried to construct a psychological framework for understanding human failure—including guilt, shame, and anxiety—as forms of self-oppression. Fear and helplessness lie at the root of these emotions, and continue or inhibit the individual in regard to his or her own life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, including love.

## OPPRESSIVE VERSUS LIBERATING THEORIES OF HUMAN CONDUCT

The table presented earlier in my discussion, "The Three Dynamics of Human Progress," can aid in distinguishing oppressive from liberating psychologies and philosophies. Here I want to focus on a key concept: the progression from viewing the human as an object (Dynamic III) to that of an agent or doer (Dynamic II) and ultimately a being (Dynamic I).

Perhaps the most fundamental distinction is between the person as a "being" in Dynamic I and the person as an "object" in Dynamic III. Skinnerian behaviorism epitomizes Dynamic III. It boldly declares the human being to be a mechanical device with no free will or autonomy. Personal freedom is seen as a mirage and personal responsibility is denigrated. Emphasis is placed upon genetics and environment as controlling factors, and various methods of social control are favored in the political arena. As Skinner (1971) observes:

> An experimental analysis shifts the determination of behavior from autonomous men to the environment—an environment responsible both for the evolution of the species and for the repertoire acquired by each member. . . . It is the autonomous inner man who is abolished, and that is a step forward. (Pp. 214–215)

In Dynamic II: Liberty, psychological and political viewpoints focus on the individual as an agent or doer with full responsibility for himself or herself. Here liberty is the highest value. In the political arena, Rose Wilder Lane (1972) exemplifies this viewpoint when she says:

> This is the nature of human energy; individuals generate it, and control it. Each person is self-controlling, and therefore responsible for his acts. Every human being, by his nature, is free. (Pp. xi–xii)

## PSYCHIATRY AS DYNAMIC III: OPPRESSION

### SZASZ'S CRITIQUE

In psychiatry, Thomas Szasz exemplies the promotion of Dynamic II: Liberty. Szasz (1965, p. 1) quotes Camus: "The aim of life can only be to increase the sum of freedom and responsibility to be found in every man and in the world. It cannot, under any circumstances, be to reduce or suppress that freedom, even temporarily."

Szasz's (1974) opposition to involuntary treatment as a crime against humanity reflects his unerring devotion to liberty. His debunking of the medical model is fundamentally an attack on the viewpoint of the person as an object.

From this Dynamic II framework, Szasz has made one of the most important contributions in the history of psychiatry. However, his work fails to reach beyond liberty to Dynamic I: Love. In his book on psychotherapy, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* (1965), he treats the psychotherapeutic encounter literally as a game, such as contract bridge. Utterly opposed to what might be called relationship or supportive therapy, Szasz (1965, p. 217) instructs the therapist, "You need not show that you are humane, that you care for him [the patient]. . . . Your sole responsibility to the patient is to analyze him." His purpose is admirable—respect for the patient's autonomy; his outcome is tragic, robbing the therapeutic process of all its spiritual verve or, worse, rejecting the patient's needs to be understood and appreciated, reinforcing his expectation that he will always be treated as an unlovable object.

Unfortunately, as Szasz has warned us so well, most theorists who attempt to move "beyond" liberty actually end up offending it. Modern psychiatry, as I shall show in the next section, is a prime example of this. The task in life is to use liberty as a staging ground for the development of voluntarily chosen higher values, especially love for others and for life. The person as a being accepts the principles of freedom but transcends it to attain a new stage of love for self, others, and life.

### A "CASE HISTORY" OF DYNAMIC III: SELF-OPPRESSION

Mr. R. came for therapy convinced that there was a conspiracy against him, not only at work but everywhere. At night he felt "electrical impulses" in his body. The sensations were generated, he claimed, by a special transmitter of unknown origin aimed at his bed. He explained in detail how his body acted like a "radio receiver."

At work, Mr. R. was a difficult, aggravating man but took no responsibility for the upset he caused and the anger that it drew upon himself.

When suggestions were made concerning how he might change his conduct, he retorted that he could not control his thoughts nor his action, since they are inevitable reactions to the influence of others. When asked about the origin of his own destructive actions, he declared outright that "they" and not himself were responsible for them.

Mr. R. saw himself as the center of arbitrary forces bent on humiliating and destroying him. He lived within a fantasy world dominated by thoughts of "getting even" with alleged persecutors.

When asked about his own choices in his life, he denied that he had any. When alternatives were suggested for new lines of action, he was quick to point out constraints and limits in his environment which made it futile for him to act. He could argue this viewpoint cogently and vehemently, mobilizing remarkable energy in defense of his viewpoint of helplessness.

Mr. R. was obsessed with the "authorities" (his boss, the FBI, possibly the CIA), who he thought played a critical role in his personal life. He hated authority but really wanted to marshal the authorities on his side against his enemies.

Mr. R. had clearly defined attitudes about force, and envisioned all people as acting on the basis of arbitrary force in a "dog eat dog" world. People got ahead by bullying and cheating. He wished he could bully and cheat better, but felt too afraid and too inadequate to try.

He had very little sense of voluntary exchange—so little so that he could not negotiate with me about a mutually convenient time for our sessions. When I asked, "What time would be best for you?" he replied, "What difference does that make?" He imagined only two alternatives: threatening and pressuring me to get the time he wanted or passively succumbing to my wishes. There was no middle ground, no exchange, and absolutely no higher ground of mutual care or concern.

Spirituality was foreign to Mr. R. Never having been loved, he had no sense of loving. A review of his childhood indicated he was treated as an object by his parents. Both were cold and unloving, both felt helpless in most areas of life and taught him the same viewpoint. As an adult, he never heard from his parents and considered it quite "natural" that they should have no interest in him.

In keeping with his cynicism about love and affiliation, Mr. R. assumed that our relationship must always be "pure business." Whatever genuine concern I might feel, he could see nothing but "dollar signs" in my eyes. When asked what affection meant to him, he answered "a way of getting manipulated." While he was very sensitive to any disapproval from me, he denied that my feelings about him had any effect on him.

The therapy with Mr. R. will involve encouraging him to move from Dynamic II: Coercion, into Dynamic II: Liberty. He needs to learn to view

himself as a doer instead of a done to. He needs to realize that he does make choices and can direct his actions in his own best interest; to discover that he has a measure of personal freedom and can chart some of his own course in life; to learn to reason effectively instead of reacting reflexively; and to develop autonomous ethics.

I hope, Mr. R. will allow our relationship to become of some importance to him, providing a gradual introduction to affiliation (Dynamic I), but merely building a modicum of self-esteem (Dynamic II) will be an achievement. Our mutual ability to make even a tentative relationship will be key to our success or failure as a team.

It is no easy task to help a man like Mr. R. At the least it will take an enormous amount of patience, understanding, and restraint on both our parts. Ironically, one of the biggest stumbling blocks to his recovery is the influence of organized psychiatry with its biological and behavioral orientation.

## THE FAILURE OF MODERN PSYCHIATRY

The basic thrust of contemporary organized psychiatry is to view the patient as an object. Mr. R. had already seen two psychiatrists, who told him he had a disease, schizophrenia, for which he and his parents have no personal responsibility and for which there is no help but drugs. The drugs appealed to him as a way of denying his personal responsibility, but he valued his thinking processes and quit taking the medications when he discovered their blunting impact on his mind.

Psychiatry views the patient exactly as the patient views himself when he is at his worst—as an object. The failing individual comes to the psychiatrist and says, in effect, "I am an object," and the psychiatrist responds, in effect, "Yes, you are. You have (or are) a disease." This dovetails with the helpless, failing individual's view of himself as under the influences of physical forces, in this case biochemicals instead of radio waves.

Increasingly, psychiatric propaganda becomes the greatest stumbling block in the way of helping suffering individuals, as the list of "diseases" with supposed biochemical causes mushrooms: schizophrenia, depression, mania, panic disorders, agoraphobia, eating disorders, sexual dysfunctions, criminal and violent behavior, alcoholism and drug addiction, and so on. Many of the problems are obvious women's issues—agoraphobia, bulimia, anorexia, and panic disorders; women are trained to develop them. Yet, they are declared biological in origin without a passing nod to what we have learned about the role of women in Western culture (see Breggin, 1991).

When the psychiatrist prescribes drugs or electroshock, the patient's worst attitudes toward himself are confirmed. Not greater agency or being-

ness but greater thingness is the answer to his or her problems. If the drugs or shock have a significant impact by disabling the brain, they will actually diminish the patient's mental capacity, making it still harder to be self-determining. I have described these brain-disabling effects, which are frequently permanent, in two medical books, *Psychiatric Drugs: Hazards to the Brain* (1983a) and *Electroshock: Its Brain-Disabling Effects* (1979), and most recently in *Toxic Psychiatry*, where I examine biological and genetic theories as well, and put them in their political context. Cohen and Cohen have also evaluated some of the broader implications of the overall biomedical approach (1986).

In drugging or shocking the patient, the psychiatrist actually pushes the individual further down the scale of human progress toward being an object. The patient—already partially convinced he or she is a thing rather than a person—now experiences brain dysfunctions that reinforce this personal experience of mental ineffectuality.

In the process of damaging the patient's brain, the psychiatrist also makes it easier for the patient to confabulate or to deny his or her personal problems. This is a tendency of brain-damaged people in general. Both the patients and the psychiatrist end up denying that the patient has any iatrogenic brain dysfunction or any responsibility for his or her personal problems. I have called this "iatrogenic denial" (Breggin, 1983, 1991)—the damaging of the patient's brain in the mutual enterprise of denying the patient's responsibility for his or her life.

Finally, the psychiatrist may use arbitrary force against the patient by committing him or her to a hospital. In doing this, the psychiatrist completes the full program associated with Dynamic III: Oppression.

It is no exaggeration to say that the helpless-acting patient and the psychiatrist attempt to implement the same oppressive dynamic: coercion of the person as an object. This is the system both understand and both operate within. It is a mutual relationship of moral destruction with vast ethical and political implications (Coleman, 1984; Breggin, 1975, 1991; Szasz, 1974).

The person labeled psychotic does not always start out thinking of himself or herself as an object. The mad person frequently begins to break down in a turmoil filled with spiritual issues of God, the nature of life, love, and the like (Breggin, 1991). In family sessions, the youngster in crisis often shows much greater awareness of the spiritual conflicts and emptiness in the family than any other members. From my experience, the youthful or incipient mad person is often an especially spiritual person born into an especially mundane and unspiritual family. The resulting identity crisis—if not bravely resolved in favor of agency and beingness—can deteriorate into a desperate state of self-oppression. Too often the psychiatrist

becomes a henchman in this self-destruction by enforcing anti-spiritual self-oppression through personal authoritarianism, drugs, or worse.

Elsewhere I have analyzed the fundamental principles and practices of psychiatry—including the medical model and involuntary treatment—and how they became critical in supporting the murder programs in Nazi Germany. In Germany, psychiatry became the theoretical and technological innovator behind the early stages of the Holocaust (Breggin, 1988; Muller-Hill, 1988). Psychiatry's crucial involvement began with the systematic murder of mental patients as a tune-up for the Holocaust. This perverse transformation of doctor into murderer resulted from psychiatry's fundamentally flawed principles.

## Summary Chart of the Three Dynamics of Progress

We can now epitomize the three essential steps in human progress, from oppression through liberty to love. This epitome captures the essence of the previously given table:

DYNAMIC I: LOVE
Highest, Psychospiritual State
Beingness
Love for Self and Others
The Human as a Being or Soul
Psychospiritual Self-fulfillment
Force as Irrelevant and Abhorrent
Mutuality & Cooperation
Humanity as One Family or Community

DYNAMIC II: LIBERTY
Staging Ground for Human Progress
Doingness
The Human as Agent or Doer
Esteem for Self and Others
Self-Direction or Self-Determination
Force Limited To Self-Defense
Competition and Contractual Agreements
Free Enterprise & Voluntary Exchange

DYNAMIC III: COERCION
Lowest Human Condition
Thingness

The Human as Object or Biochemical Device
Indifference toward Self and Others
Other-Direction or Other-Determination
Force as a Means to Any End
Exploitation & Subjugation
Totalitarianism & Involuntary Relationships

## Conclusion

Progress in our personal or political lives is not inevitable. It can be enhanced by an understanding of the values at stake and their implications for human life. This three-dynamics theory of human progress—from oppression through liberty to love—helps us understand the progress of individuals, groups, institutions, and societies.

The Three Dynamics Theory can help expand our ideas about humanistic, existential psychology in a variety of ways. First, it can help to unify psychology with all other human studies—including philosophy, economics, politics and religion—through a common value system rooted in respect and love for the subjective, choice-making individual.

Second, and closely related, the theory finds within free-enterprise economics and humanistic psychology a common basis of commitment to each person's right to pursue his or her own subjectively chosen values and lifestyle.

Third, it provides the therapist with a set of values to close the gap between those promoted in therapy and personal living and those promoted in the broader economic and political arena.

Fourth, the Three Dynamics Theory permits an analysis of personal failure that corresponds exactly with institutional and societal failure. The one hierarchy of values helps us understand success and failure whether it is viewed intrapsychically, interpersonally, socioeconomically, politically, or spiritually.

Fifth, the system integrates the concepts of liberty and love. Individualism and liberty, the dual backbone of much of what is politically good in the Western tradition, have seemed at odds with psychospiritual values such as love and altruism. The three-dynamics theory, with its firm rooting in economic and political theory, provides perspective on the creative relationship between the egoism of the free-enterprise system and higher values, such as altruism and humanity, as one family. While the application of the theory to politics becomes extremely complex and fraught with difficulties (Breggin, forthcoming), it is relatively easy to apply the theory to interpersonal relationships, including psychotherapy.

Sixth, the system sheds light on critical problems for humanistic psychology, such as the personal failure of the mad person and the corresponding failure of biobehavioral psychiatry to offer any meaningful help. It explains how psychiatry—with its biological explanations of human conduct and its physical treatments—actually encourages the patient to continue viewing himself or herself as a helpless object.

This three-dynamics analysis of human progress encourages a return to treating the human studies—from psychology through theology, economics, and politics—as one fabric rather than as a fragmented disarray of diverse studies.

## NOTE

1. Kenneth Boulding (1968, 1978) developed a three-dynamics theory for society which bears some resemblance to this one, and helped inspire its development. Boulding's theory is applied to society, and not to individuals, and embraces somewhat different principles, especially in regard to defining force and love.

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